Exclusive: ‘Iran can produce a nuclear Bomb probably within 3 to 7 days’ says Trita Parsi founder of the National Iranian American Council

Source : INDIA TODAY NEWS

In an exclusive interview with Trita Parsi, founder of the National Iranian American Council, the veteran Middle East analyst warned that Iran is edging dangerously close to nuclear weapons capability. He said “They have the technical capacity to build or produce enriched uranium at weapons levels, and they have enough significantly high-enriched uranium to be able to produce enough material for one bomb, probably within 3 to 7 days.”

He argued that the core of the crisis isn’t just uranium enrichment—but the collapse of diplomacy—and pointed the finger at a familiar player “The reason why the Israelis would rather have a confrontation than a deal is because, from their standpoint, they look at this and they say: if there is a deal and it prevents Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, it will reduce U.S.-Iran tensions. It will enable the United States to leave the Middle East militarily and reduce its military power there significantly. But will that necessarily lead to a proportionate reduction in tensions between Iran and Israel?”

Asked how Iran might respond to military pressure, Parsi said Tehran isn’t looking for war—but it’s ready to inflict damage. “The Iranian missile capability is quite effective,” he said.

He also said “If there is a war, I cannot foresee the Chinese or the Russians providing any particular support. They might sell some weapons and things of that nature, but the idea that they would enter the war is essentially out of the question.”

Question: The fact that there is a threat perception that Iran is very close to making a bomb the IAEA chiefRafael Grossi, said that they had reached enrichment levels that can clearly make a nuclear bomb. In your appreciation and your reading of the situation on the ground, how close is Iran?

Trita Parsi
Let me first clarify one point that I think is very important to understand. They have the technical capacity to build or produce enriched uranium at weapons levels, and they have enough significantly high-enriched uranium to be able to produce enough material for one bomb, probably within 3 to 7 days. However, having the material for a bomb—the fissile material for a bomb—and having a bomb are two very different things. And it will take them probably somewhere between 1.5 and 3 years to get to that point.

And even more importantly, according to the U.S. intelligence services—echoed by European and other intelligence services—they have not made a decision to build a bomb. So they’re currently not active in a weapons programme, but they are producing material that could be used for that. So that in itself is, of course, a challenge, but I don’t think it is a cause for panic. There is still plenty of time to be able to resolve this—and to resolve this in a very satisfactory way.

The problem is that, from the Israeli perspective, they prefer a military confrontation, even if it potentially will lead Iran to building a bomb, rather than some form of a deal between the United States and Iran that not only prevents a nuclear weapon but actually brings about a better relationship between the United States and Iran. That’s from the Israeli step.

Question: Why do you say that the Israelis for whom they keep continuing to harp on the fact that it’s an existential threat—why do you think they’d be willing to go into a military conflict as opposed to maybe looking at normalisation of ties?

Trita Parsi
Yeah, I think that is really the key question. And first of all, I think we have to recognise that the Israelis say that this is an existential threat. Their conduct is not revealing that they actually believe it is an existential threat. You have several key officials in Israel—three Mossad heads in a row, from Efraim to Pardo to Meir Dagan—who were on record saying the programme is not an existential threat to Israel. Ehud Barak has kept on saying over and over again it’s not an existential threat, because it really diminishes Israel’s power, and Israel’s power is very, very significant.

The reason why the Israelis would rather have a confrontation than a deal is because, from their standpoint, they look at this and they say: if there is a deal and it prevents Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, it will reduce U.S.-Iran tensions. It will enable the United States to leave the Middle East militarily and reduce its military power there significantly. But will that necessarily lead to a proportionate reduction in tensions between Iran and Israel? Their conclusion—in my view, incorrectly—is that it won’t. And it means to them that Iran will remain a threat, a challenge for the Israelis, even though they will have improved relations with the U.S. The U.S. will lose interest, it will leave the region, it will focus on Asia, on China. And as a result, this kicks in the Israeli fear of abandonment—that they will be left alone in the region facing Iran, no longer having this type of automatic American support, because the U.S. has reduced its tension—not necessarily resolved it fully—but is no longer prioritising it in the manner that it has been for some time.

It’s important also to keep one thing in mind: when you take a look at what the Israeli military option is—and this is very important to understand, as I suggested earlier—the Israeli military option would push back the Iranian programme one year. The JCPOA pushed it back a minimum of 10 years. If the weapon is truly the problem for the Israelis, why are they preferring an option that pushes it back one year, destabilises the region, and creates all kinds of unpredictable repercussions, to one that would have pushed it back 10 years—probably even longer?

Question: We will talk about the negotiations—because the two rounds are already over, and Wednesday we have the technical talks—but before that, again: right side of history, wrong side of history, internal politics and dynamics of Iran have led to a lot of criticism, invited a lot of sanctions for Iran. But today, as we sit and you’re looking at the Palestine crisis, you’re looking at Gaza—and we look at countries that have actually come out absolutely supporting the people of Gaza—it’s not the Sunni Arab world, it’s the Shia Iran that actually is supporting and backing the cause for Palestine.

Trita Parsi
To a certain extent, that is true. I think we have to make a distinction between Arab governments and Arab populations. I don’t think for a second that the populations in the Arab world—in the Sunni Arab world—are not extremely supportive of the Palestinians and extremely upset. You just take a look at Morocco: there’s been ongoing, massive demonstrations in the country that actually normalised relations with Israel because the populations are not at all, in any way, shape, or form, happy.

In the case of Turkey—now, of course, I think the Turks are playing a double game, similar to what the Iranians played with Israel 40, 50 years ago. It is true that in terms of armed resistance, the support is primarily coming from Iran. It’s not coming from any of the Arab states in that sense. But I think the picture is very complicated, and if there is a deal between the United States and Iran on the nuclear issue, it will be very interesting to see how that will affect—or not affect—Iran’s position on Israel and Palestine.

I think already at this stage, the belief that the path to victory for them is through armed resistance is definitely taking quite a beating, because it’s not working out the way they necessarily hoped. On the other hand, there is no willingness to succumb to what the Israelis are doing right now, which is the ethnic cleansing of all of Palestine, not just Gaza.

I think more than anything else, the question is: where is the rest of the world? Where is Europe? Where is the West—that for so long argued the moral standpoint in terms of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—and then completely threw those morals down the drain as soon as the Israelis started behaving much worse than the Russians did in Ukraine.

Question: One of the Palestinians I was speaking with, an activist, an author, and a professor herself, said, “You know, the color of our skin really matters. It is different when it’s Ukrainian. It’s different when it’s Palestinian.” But of course, there are more layers and complications to how the United States looks at Palestine. Having said that, and again, we’ll go to the negotiations, but how does Iran not depend on nuclear weapons alone? They have the best drone technology, one of the best in the world. They employ asymmetric warfare. It’s not conventional. They have bunkers, underground systems where they have amassed a lot of weapons and weapon systems, very highly sophisticated ones. How strong is Iran actually militarily, or is this just to show that you have a narrative building where you hear people say, and you hear it from the Iranian side as well, that they have this, that, and so on and so forth? Do they really have it? How strong are they militarily?

Trita Parsi
So I think the Israeli argument right now is that because of the defeat of Hezbollah and the collapse of Syria, Iran is remarkably, perhaps uniquely, weak in the region compared to previous periods, and I think there is truth to that. There’s no doubt that the loss of Assad is a major blow to Iran. The weakening and compromising of Hezbollah has been a huge blow. All of that was one out of three elements of Iran’s deterrence. One was these different groups that were like a first line of defense against Israel. Then you had Iran’s missile program, and then you have a potential nuclear deterrent. If one of them is lost, the importance of the other two increases.

When it comes to the missile program, what we can say is that despite the fact that clearly the way they shot those missiles at Israel on two occasions in April and October of 2024, it was largely meant to show their capacity rather than inflict damage. I mean, they seem to have gone to great lengths to avoid allowing anyone to get killed. But nevertheless, they managed to do something that I think took the Israelis really by surprise. They managed to penetrate all layers of Israel’s anti-defense system. The Arrow 1 and 2, the Patriots, the S-300, the Iron Dome—all of these were not sufficient to shoot down all of the different missiles. To the extent that the Israelis went to the United States and asked for the deployment of THAAD batteries, which is the most sophisticated anti-missile system that exists. And I think at this stage the US has about eight of them, and they have deployed two of them in Israel. They would never have asked for that had it not been for the fact that the Iranian missile capability is quite effective, and they could not entirely withstand that.

That, however, does not mean that Iran could win a war necessarily. What it means is that a war would be extremely costly, extremely devastating, and destabilizing. And we have now, what, three or four American presidents who have decided this is not worth it. If you take a look at the Trump administration’s focus, which is to shift their attention increasingly toward China, the argument that has been resonating inside the administration is that this would be such a massive distraction and abuse of resources, a loss of resources that they believe they will need for other things. As a result, the opposition to this is overwhelming within the American military establishment in the White House right now, at least with the president.

What you have, however, is that from the Israeli perspective, they believe if they cannot get this done now, if they cannot convince Trump to do so, it may be their last chance. And they want to do this as soon as possible as well because they’re running against the diplomatic clock. They are quite fearful that the Iranians will be able to entice Trump with a deal that may not be as advanced on the nuclear stage as the previous deal was, but that will offer the United States other things, such as access to the Iranian market and the lifting of the primary sanctions, which would be quite attractive, particularly for a businessman like Trump who’s never been a huge fan of these different sanctions. So I think you see a ferocious battle right now taking place in which the Israelis are doing everything they can to make sure that this deal does not happen.

Question: Let’s just talk about the enticement then. Two rounds of talks between Iran and the United States of America. It seems like they’ve been constructive. Where do you see it headed, and the demands that have been made by Iran? Are there red lines here that are no-go areas for Washington, D.C., under Trump?

Trita Parsi
So we know what the red lines are for the Iranian side, and that is they are not going to dismantle their program. They’re going to continue to have enrichment, but they can give guarantees, inspections, verification, and insights in order to make sure it doesn’t move toward weaponization. They’re not going to get rid of their missile program either, nor are they going to let the United States dictate who they will have relations with. However, as I mentioned, those are the three pillars of their deterrence. Asking them to give up all three essentially is asking them to have absolutely no defenses whatsoever. That’s something you can potentially ask them once you’ve defeated them militarily, but to ask that up front is a complete nonstarter. Now, that doesn’t mean there might not be some elements or aspects of the missile program that could be up for discussion, or that how some of those relationships are going to be conducted can also be up for discussion. But the core of it is going to be the nuclear program. Trump has said something very important. He said that his only red line is that Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon, which means he prioritizes the nuclear program. He does not prioritize the missile program. He does not prioritize the situation in the region, relations with the Houthis, etc. That doesn’t mean that he doesn’t think those are important or that he won’t try to have a conversation or negotiation with the Iranians down the road, but his priority is the nuclear program, which makes sense because that’s the one that actually could be a challenge for the United States. The rest of it may be a challenge for Israel, for other states in the region, but Trump has to pursue U.S. interests first rather than allowing Israeli interests to dictate what he’s doing.

Question: The nuclear program, not having nuclear weapons systems, and going nuclear in terms of arms, is something that could be acceptable for Iran. They do not want to stop enrichment. They have always cited a civil nuclear program for power, for energy, energy security, and so on and so forth. Is there a middle ground they could find in really cutting a deal? And in that deal, knowing how resource-rich Iran is, could Trump then be looking at Iranian resources as well? We’ve seen what’s happened with Russia and Ukraine.

Trita Parsi
I think so. I think absolutely there is a pathway to a deal because, as long as, of course, the Iranians adopt reasonable positions and the U.S. does the same, if either one of them starts adopting maximalist positions, that’s when you will likely see the talks fail. So, for instance, from the American side, Trump seems to have gone for a verification solution rather than a dismantlement of the program. The next thing that the hawks are throwing in there is to say there should be no sunsets. There should be nothing in the deal that expires. That’s also not going to work. It’s already been tried. If you push for that, you’ll likely get no deal, and it’s no surprise that the person within the administration pushing for that is Marco Rubio, who has expressed a more favorable view toward military action. So, there’s still a tremendous risk of these excessive maximalist demands. If that’s what they pursue, there will not be a deal. But if they are pursuing what they’re doing right now, then I think there is a clear pathway to a deal. An important difference between now and 2015 is that in 2015, this deal—the JCPOA—had overwhelming support in the world. Only three countries opposed it: the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Today, the Saudis and the Israelis are strongly supporting the deal. They’re even trying to help mediate the deal. The only country that is left opposing it is Israel, which is a big difference between now and 2015.

Question: If you could zoom out a little and talk about the support that Iran has, not just from the region, but also from smaller countries like China and Russia. Should there be a situation, and that’s the reading of the room when it comes to the Trump administration as well, that if there is an escalation, then China and Russia would also be something for the West to face. Is that a scenario? Is that something that has been read and studied in detail?

Trita Parsi
I think neither Russia nor China, in any way, shape, or form, want to see a war, but also, I don’t think they want to be part of that war. If there is a war, I cannot foresee the Chinese or the Russians providing any particular support. They might sell some weapons and things of that nature, but the idea that they would enter the war is essentially out of the question. That’s not what’s going to happen. But it will be a war that likely will have such a destabilizing effect on the region as a whole that it will affect everyone, and it will affect Europe. Because if you start seeing massive refugee flows once more out of the Middle East, they’re not going to go to the United States. They’re not going to go to Asia. They’re going to go to Europe. Europe has a clear interest in making sure that this deal is struck. The European position, however, has become complicated for two reasons. On the one hand, the Europeans are cut out of the deal. They’re not at the table. This is deeply upsetting to them, but they were also cut out of Ukraine, and Ukraine is even more important for them. But the other aspect of it is that the deal Trump seems to be pursuing has a Russian component to it. Russia is likely going to play some sort of nuclear role as part of this deal, potentially hosting Iran’s low-enriched uranium. I think the Europeans are worried that this will further normalize Russia, that this will once again bring Russia out from the cold in a way that the Europeans do not want unless there is a satisfactory solution to the Ukraine problem. The challenge the Europeans have, of course, is that they have no pathway to what they call a satisfactory solution to Ukraine. So, for three years, they’ve just been doubling down on a military option that is not even their own option. It’s based on the U.S. supporting it, and the United States, at this point, is no longer in the mood to do so. So, Europe has really put itself in a very, very difficult bind, and it’s also affecting this issue, even though the Europeans played a critical role in getting the previous deal.

Question: You’ve been following the negotiations, and the Iranians are known to be some of the best negotiators in the world. Do you think the Trump administration and their negotiators have the skill set to deal with Iran?

Trita Parsi
I think that the skill set, negotiation-wise, is there. Whether they have the technical knowledge to be able to match what the Iranians have, because the Iranian team is the same team that negotiated not just with Obama but also later on with Biden. So, they know the files very, very well. The American negotiators, at least the top negotiators, are very new to this issue. And the extent to which the Trump administration will use the technical expertise that exists within the government, despite the fact that those individuals played a role in the JCPOA, remains to be seen. As you know, that is a sensitive topic for Trump.

SOURCE :- TIMES OF INDIA